Opinion: Youssef El Maddarsi, Business Director of Naoris Protocol
Some Bitcoin (BTC) supporters argue that the network does not face any significant quantum threat in the near future, pointing to emerging NIST-approved post-quantum standards and suggesting that Bitcoin may simply be modernized well before any cryptographically significant quantum computer emerges. This confidence is based on the risky assumption that the quantum threat only begins when a machine can crack keys in real time. Adam Back argued that Bitcoin has at least 20-40 years to prepare, but the quantum threat is already lively today.
Bitcoin cannot rely on a velvety upgrade path lasting many decades.
Some readers may strongly object to this, arguing that the quantum timeline is still too uncertain to warrant urgent action and that sounding alarms risks creating unnecessary fear. The facts do not support complacency.
IBM recently made a huge step toward practical quantum computing with a novel generation of chips, saying these processors and their faster error correction methods could enable the company to achieve quantum advantage in 2026 and deliver early fault-tolerant systems by 2029. So the race is intensifying.
Vitalik Buterin said at the 2025 Devconnect conference that quantum computers could break elliptic curve cryptography sooner than expected, perhaps even before the 2028 US elections, and advocated Ethereum’s transition to quantum-resistant cryptography within a few years. This contradicts the convenient narrative of some Bitcoin enthusiasts showing that even Ethereum’s founder believes that the quantum timeline is much tighter than people want to believe.
Quantum risk is already crucial from the market point of view
Deloitte also reported this roughly recently 4 million BTC, which constitutes approximately 25% of the total usable supply, is located at addresses that expose public keys to quantum attacks. Researchers have long warned that a sufficiently advanced quantum computer could derive private keys from exposed public keys using Shor’s algorithm, allowing attackers to instantly exhaust legacy wallets.
This is not specific to Bitcoin. Ethereum and most blockchains today are based on elliptic curve cryptography, and quantum technology will destroy this. Buterin has already done it scratched emergency procedures for the day quantum computers crack Ethereum accounts.
The “we can update later” argument doesn’t work in practice
The argument that Bitcoin has decades to prepare for a quantum threat is based on the belief that it can simply adopt the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) post-quantum cryptography standards before any significant attack is possible, but updating Bitcoin is not a petty patch. This is a fundamental change to the protocol’s signature scheme. According to researchers at the University of Kent, upgrading Bitcoin to a quantum-resistant cryptosystem could require up to 75 days of downtime, and possibly more than 300 days if the network must operate at reduced capacity to limit attack vectors during migration. A prolonged global outage of a trillion-dollar asset class is not something the industry can consider an acceptable “just-in-time” solution.
Related: The quantum threat to Bitcoin extends to attacks by wallet hackers
Even if Bitcoin were technically capable of a velvety migration, political reality poses another barrier. Bitcoin’s governance culture is famously resistant to change, as evidenced by the years of debate and coordination required for Taproot, a relatively modest update. A mandatory, high-risk migration to an entirely novel crypto foundation would create ideological conflict, potential chain splits, and long-term uncertainty. The idea that such an overhaul could conveniently be carried out decades from now ignores the opposing dynamics that Bitcoin has faced with much simpler improvements.
Meanwhile, the quantum timeline is accelerating faster than many expect. The European Commission and EU Member States recently released a coordinated action plan to transition the bloc’s digital infrastructure to post-quantum cryptography (PQC), recognizing the threat quantum computers pose to existing encryption. The plan sets a harmonized timetable: all Member States must launch national PQC strategies and initial stages of migration by 2026; critical infrastructure and other high-risk sectors must adopt quantum-resistant encryption by 2030; and by 2035, the transition to PQC should be complete for all systems that can be modernized.
The market impact of a delayed transition could be disastrous
What makes this threat particularly urgent for cryptocurrencies is the market effect of a poorly executed transition. If an attacker were to operate quantum hardware to obtain private keys from dormant Bitcoin wallets, they could suddenly move millions of long-dormant coins, flooding exchanges and crashing price levels. Similarly, a malicious quantum miner that could consistently solve Bitcoin’s proof-of-work puzzles would undermine mining decentralization, turning the global industry into an oligopoly dominated by entities equipped with quantum technologies. These risks will change the market structure long before the theoretical secure window of 20-40 years occurs.
Post-quantum cryptography is absolutely necessary, but it must be implemented before adversaries develop the hardware, not after. NIST standards are a roadmap, not a guarantee. The path of transition will be long, controversial and destructive. Pretending this can be put off for decades risks exposing Bitcoin and the broader crypto ecosystem to the most crucial security challenge of the century.
The cryptocurrency industry has spent 15 years defending decentralization, distrust and user sovereignty. Quantum computing now poses a novel challenge: will the industry act proactively or wait for a crisis to prompt action. The cost of making a mistake is much greater than the cost of early preparation.
Many may believe that Bitcoin has had a run for several decades. The evidence points to a different conclusion: the quantum clock is already ticking and the market is quietly adapting. The only question is whether the industry will get going before time runs out.
Opinion: Youssef El Maddarsi, Business Director of Naoris Protocol.
This opinion article represents the author’s expert opinion and may not reflect the views of Cointelegraph.com. This content has been editorially reviewed for clarity and relevance. Cointelegraph remains committed to limpid reporting and the highest journalistic standards. We encourage readers to conduct their own research before taking any action with the company.
This opinion article represents the author’s expert opinion and may not reflect the views of Cointelegraph.com. This content has been editorially reviewed for clarity and relevance. Cointelegraph remains committed to limpid reporting and the highest journalistic standards. We encourage readers to conduct their own research before taking any action with the company.
